Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Insights From Non-human Primates by Burkart, Judith M et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Insights From Non-human Primates
Burkart, Judith M; Brügger, Rahel K; van Schaik, Carel P
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2018.00017
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-157390
Journal Article
Published Version
 
 
The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
License.
Originally published at:
Burkart, Judith M; Brügger, Rahel K; van Schaik, Carel P (2018). Evolutionary Origins of Morality:
Insights From Non-human Primates. Frontiers in Sociology, 3:17.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2018.00017
REVIEW
published: 09 July 2018
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2018.00017
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 1 July 2018 | Volume 3 | Article 17
Edited by:
Nicola Lettieri,
Istituto Nazionale per l’Analisi delle
Politiche Pubbliche (INAPP), Italy
Reviewed by:
Christopher R. von Rueden,
University of Richmond, United States
Sam Sloss,
Indiana University Southeast,
United States
*Correspondence:
Judith M. Burkart
judith.burkart@aim.uzh.ch
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Evolutionary Sociology and
Biosociology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Sociology
Received: 06 November 2017
Accepted: 12 June 2018
Published: 09 July 2018
Citation:
Burkart JM, Brügger RK and van
Schaik CP (2018) Evolutionary Origins
of Morality: Insights From Non-human
Primates. Front. Sociol. 3:17.
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2018.00017
Evolutionary Origins of Morality:
Insights From Non-human Primates
Judith M. Burkart*, Rahel K. Brügger and Carel P. van Schaik
Department of Anthropology, University of Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland
The aim of this contribution is to explore the origins of moral behavior and its
underlying moral preferences and intuitions from an evolutionary perspective. Such
a perspective encompasses both the ultimate, adaptive function of morality in our
own species, as well as the phylogenetic distribution of morality and its key elements
across primates. First, with regard to the ultimate function, we argue that human moral
preferences are best construed as adaptations to the affordances of the fundamentally
interdependent hunter-gatherer lifestyle of our hominin ancestors. Second, with regard
to the phylogenetic origin, we show that even though full-blown human morality is unique
to humans, several of its key elements are not. Furthermore, a review of evidence
from non-human primates regarding prosocial concern, conformity, and the potential
presence of universal, biologically anchored and arbitrary cultural norms shows that
these elements of morality are not distributed evenly across primate species. This
suggests that they have evolved along separate evolutionary trajectories. In particular,
the element of prosocial concern most likely evolved in the context of shared infant
care, which can be found in humans and some New World monkeys. Strikingly, many
if not all of the elements of morality found in non-human primates are only evident in
individualistic or dyadic contexts, but not as third-party reactions by truly uninvolved
bystanders. We discuss several potential explanations for the unique presence of a
systematic third-party perspective in humans, but focus particularly on mentalizing ability
and language. Whereas both play an important role in present day, full-blown human
morality, it appears unlikely that they played a causal role for the original emergence
of morality. Rather, we suggest that the most plausible scenario to date is that human
morality emerged because our hominin ancestors, equipped on the one hand with large
and powerful brains inherited from their ape-like ancestor, and on the other hand with
strong prosocial concern as a result of cooperative breeding, could evolve into an ever
more interdependent social niche.
Keywords: evolution, morality, hunter-gatherers, prosociality, norm violations, concern for reputation, cooperative
breeding, non-human primates
INTRODUCTION
Contemplation of law as a natural social phenomenon quickly reveals that it cannot be reduced
to purely rational processes and explicit reasoning. It is fundamentally built on (albeit not
identical with) our sense for morality, the propensity to differentiate actions, decisions, and
intentions between those that are proper and right and those that are improper or wrong
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(Long and Sedley, 1987). This evaluation can be the result of
deliberation, but also of automatic proximate mechanisms such
as intuitions that are expressed by a variety of moral emotions,
motivations, and preferences which often have a high-urgency
feel (Weaver et al., 2014).
Social scientists have traditionally considered morality as a
recent, purely cultural innovation, seemingly necessary to keep
our otherwise brutish nature under control (e.g., reviewed in
Long and Sedley, 1987; de Waal, 2006; Haidt, 2013). In support
of this conjecture, what is considered moral in a given culture or
society, or what the corresponding systems of laws prescribe, can
indeed be quite variable. However, despite this variability in the
content of what counts as moral among cultures, there are also
elements that seem universal, both with regard to the proximate
mechanisms that regulate moral behavior and the content of
moral norms. For instance, Barrett et al. (2016) found that across
societies, including small-scale societies, humans take an agent’s
reason for action into account for moral judgments, but they also
found independent variation when looking at specific contents,
e.g., harm vs. theft, or in how the content influences the role
of intentionality. Furthermore, even if conformist transmission
could in principle stabilize a variety of behaviors and norms
(Chudek and Henrich, 2011), there appears strong canalization
in that some kinds of content (such as for instance not to
harm others, or engage in parental investment) are more readily
considered moral than others (van Schaik, 2016).
Ubiquitous key elements of human morality discussed in
this paper are prosocial concern and conformity, as well as
the moral contents of doing good, not harming others, and
avoiding inequity and incest (van Schaik, 2016). Importantly,
these elements are not only expressed when the individual is
personally involved, i.e., in individualistic or dyadic contexts, but
also in the absence of personal involvement, i.e., in third-party
contexts. For instance, moral behavior not only includes the urge
to conform to the rules and norms of one’s own community, but
also evokes strong feelings that others ought to do so as well. The
universal presence of these elements of morality across human
societies suggests there is an evolved core to morality, which
should therefore be amenable to a functional and comparative
evolutionary analysis sensu Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1963; Bateson
and Laland, 2013).
Such an evolutionary analysis claims that whenever universal,
proximate mechanisms have evolved, they must have done so
to fulfill a specific adaptive function. In the first section of
this contribution we will argue that the adaptive function of
our evolved morality was to enable the highly interdependent
life-style of Pleistocene hunter-gathers.
An evolutionary analysis of human morality also includes the
examination of its phylogenetic origin, to which we will turn in
the second section. Whereas full-blown human morality, which
includes explicit moral reasoning and evaluation, may well be
unique to humans, some of its elements or building blocks are
not, and we can use data from non-human primates to trace the
evolutionary history of each of them separately. An obvious first,
and very popular, step is to look at the great apes, and in particular
the chimpanzees and bonobos (e.g., deWaal, 2006), to investigate
the possible presence of a specific building block in our closest
relatives. However, a broader and more informative comparative
approach consists in mapping the presence or absence of each
of these building blocks or traits in a broader set of species, to
then test which factor best predicts this pattern of distribution
(MacLean, 2016). If the specific case of humans fits such an
identified pattern, this allows us to identify the evolutionary
context of the emergence of this trait. This approach thus ideally
allows not only to identify that a trait is or is not unique to
humans, but also why it is present in a given set of species,
including humans.
HUNTER-GATHERERS: THE
EVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT OF THE
EMERGENCE OF HUMAN MORALITY
As a species, humans have spent 95% of their evolutionary past as
Pleistocene hunter-gatherers (Hill et al., 2011). Even though we
cannot travel back in time and observe how these people lived, the
few remaining hunter-gatherer societies across the globe allow
us a glimpse into our evolutionary past, by providing useful
models for the reconstruction of ancestral selection pressures.
Intriguingly, despite often considerable geographical distance
and principled variation, these societies are rather homogeneous
(Marlowe, 2005), and the communalities between them therefore
are likely representative for the evolutionary context in which
human sociality in general, and thus morality, has evolved.
Nomadic hunter-gatherers live in highly interdependent,
egalitarian societies (Marlowe, 2005). Even though some
individuals can be more influential than others, major decisions
are usually made collectively. In fact, if some individual tries to
rise to a leader position through coercive leadership in order to
dominate the rest of the group, the majority will try to prevent
this (Boehm, 2012). Hunter-gatherers form socially recognized
pair bonds (i.e., marriages), and show amarked sexual division of
labor: women gather and men hunt cooperatively, fish, or collect
honey (Marlowe, 2007). The foraging niche is skill-intensive
and often requires intense cooperation. The skills are socially
transmitted and shaped by cumulative cultural evolution (Dean
et al., 2014; Hill et al., 2014), and it takes women until their mid-
twenties, and men even longer, to become fully efficient foragers.
The social structure and networks of hunter-gatherers in fact
appears to optimize efficient transmission of cultural knowledge.
Either sex may disperse, but adult brothers and sisters often co-
reside. Most individuals in the group are unrelated, and strong
ties with non-kin play an important role for the spread of skills
and knowledge (Hill et al., 2011; Migliano et al., 2017).
Hunter-gatherer lives are characterized by high levels of
interdependence in almost all contexts and at different time-
scales. Food sharing is vital, at the time scale of days (hunters,
but also foragers, may return empty-handed), weeks to months
(in case of sickness or injury), and years to decades (families
with growing children do not produce enough and rely on
younger and older camp members: Sugiyama and Chacon, 2005;
Kaplan et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2011). Gathered food is generally
shared within families, but honey and meat, in particular from
large animals, which are hunted cooperatively, are shared with
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all other families in a camp (Wood and Marlowe, 2013). In
general, food is shared with those who are needy, but also
preferentially with those who have shared in the past. It is thus
crucial that someone build a good reputation and support others
without being solicited, to ensure receiving support when needy
themselves. A good reputation is thus vital, because sooner or
later this need will arrive. Men can gain status by being generous
(Gurven et al., 2000; Marlowe, 2010), and by participating in
coordinated collective action, as during warfare, cooperative
hunting, gathering, or moving camp.
Not only subsistence and foraging activities are fundamentally
cooperative, but also child rearing. For a mother, it is almost
impossible to rear a child successfully by herself, and she receives
ample support from others, in particular fathers, grandmothers
and older siblings, but also from other camp members (Hrdy,
2009). In fact, humans qualify as cooperative breeders, a
reproductive system also known in several other animals, such as
many bird species, but also wolves, or callitrichid monkeys. In all
these species, including humans (Sear and Mace, 2008), parents
obtain a significant amount of help in rearing their offspring,
and both growth and survival of the offspring depends on the
availability of helpers. Cooperative breeding typically evolves
when conditions are harsh, which makes it increasingly difficult
for mothers to raise their offspring alone (Burkart et al., 2017b).
When our hominin ancestors moved into the savanna, food was
more often dispersed and hidden underground than before. This
required not only more cooperation during foraging and more
elaborate food processing techniques (e.g., cooking: Wrangham,
2009), but also made it more difficult for mothers to rear their
offspring independently. This is in strong contrast to all the other
great apes, wheremothers raise their offspring independently and
are well able to do so. Furthermore, large brains require large
amounts of energy, in particular during ontogeny (Kuzawa et al.,
2014). It is thus parsimonious to assume that our ancestors had
already started to engage in systematic allomaternal care rather
early since otherwise the evolution of our big brains would not
have been possible (Isler and van Schaik, 2012).
Human morality can be understood as a straight-forward
adaptation to this hunter-gatherer life-style, in that it enables
and stabilizes interdependence (see also van Schaik et al., 2014).
According to this hypothesis, one key element of morality, a
prosocial predisposition, is crucial to maintain food sharing
with immatures and adults. Having a good reputation serves as
insurance to being cared for when in need, and also for being
chosen as a mate or cooperation partner. A strong concern for
one’s reputation, including reputation management, thus ensues.
The second element, an urge to conform, is crucial in a niche
where coordinated or synchronized action is vital for survival. In
addition, the urge to conform serves to acquire themany complex
skills that make up our ecological niche via social learning. When
skills and knowledge are opaque, i.e., when it is not obvious
how separate steps involved in an activity lead to an overall goal,
trustful copying even of seemingly useless elements is mandatory
(Henrich and Broesch, 2011; Dean et al., 2014).
The ultimate function of human morality and its key elements
can thus readily be understood as an adaptation to the hunter-
gatherer lifestyle. But are these elements unique to humans, or
can some of them, or perhaps their precursors, also be found in
other primates, and if so, why? These questions are important
because a better understanding of the phylogenetic origins of
elements of morality in non-human species can help evaluate the
functional hypothesis that human morality has evolved to solve
problems inherent to a fundamentally interdependent lifestyle.
EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF THE
BUILDING BLOCKS OF MORALITY
Building blocks of morality include both mechanisms and
contents. For clarity, we discuss them separately (mechanisms:
section Prosocial Concern, and section Conformity; contents:
section Social Norms I: Universal, Biologically Anchored
Contents, and section Social Norms II: Arbitrary, Culturally
Variable Norms). However, links between them exist and will
be addressed in the corresponding sections. An important issue
for full-blown morality that applies to all building blocks is
whether they are expressed in individualistic or dyadic contexts
only, or whether they are also present in third-party contexts.
For instance, can a prosocial concern in a given species be
found between an actor and a recipient only, or do non-involved
third parties (i.e., non-involved bystanders) also evaluate the
prosocial interaction between an actor and a recipient as morally
appropriate? This third-party perspective is an overarching
hallmark of human morality in general and we will therefore also
focus on this particular aspect when reviewing the evidence from
non-human animals.
Prosocial Concern
One key element of human morality is prosocial concern, i.e., a
concern not only with one’s own but also with others’ well-being,
also referred to as other-regarding preferences by behavioral
economists (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). In the primatological
literature, it is often referred to as proactive prosociality, to
stress that the corresponding behaviors, such as for instance food
sharing, are not the result of solicitation by recipients, begging, or
even harassment, but that they are initiated spontaneously by the
actor without triggering by other individuals (Jaeggi et al., 2010).
Over the last decade, proactive prosociality has been
extensively studied in a number of primate species. Early studies
found it was absent in chimpanzees, who are independent
breeders, but present in the small marmoset monkeys, who
like humans, are cooperative breeders (Cronin, 2012; Marshall-
Pescini et al., 2016). Importantly, even though the evolution
of cooperative breeding is based on inclusive fitness benefits
(Burkart et al., 2017b), kin selection and relatedness per se cannot
explain why some primates show proactive prosociality but
others don’t. First, marmosets can show proactive prosociality
toward non-related group members as well, and even strangers
who are potential group members (Burkart et al., 2007). Second,
highly related mother-offspring dyads in independently breeding
primates, including chimpanzees (Ueno and Matsuzawa, 2004),
fail to show proactive prosociality.
Later prosociality studies produced more mixed results, also
because different methodologies make it difficult to compare
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between studies and species (Burkart and Rueth, 2013). A large
comparative study therefore compared proactive prosociality
across 15 primate species, using exactly the same methodology
and thus providing directly comparable data. Phylogenetic
analyses revealed that the extent of allomaternal care, (i.e., the
amount of help that mothers receive from others when rearing
infants, with cooperative breeding found in the higher range of
values) is indeed the best predictor for proactive prosociality in
a group service paradigm, whereas brain size or other socio-
ecological factors cannot explain a significant amount of inter-
specific variation (Burkart et al., 2014).
Accordingly, chimpanzees, our closest relatives, scored low
on prosociality. Nevertheless, their score was not zero, which
corresponds to reports of occasional targeted helping in this
species (Warneken and Tomasello, 2015; but see Tennie et al.,
2016), as well as occasional food sharing or alerting others
of danger. In addition to prosociality, targeted helping also
has an important cognitive component, which is particularly
strong in the large-brained apes (Burkart et al., 2017a). A highly
relevant test case are bonobos, for which evidence for proactive
prosociality is quite mixed (Tan and Hare, 2013; Tan et al.,
2015, 2017), but who unfortunately were not in the cross-species
sample of the group service study.
In sum, among primates, proactive prosociality increases
with the amount of allomaternal care found in a species and
culminates in cooperative breeders. Since humans also qualify as
cooperative breeders, it is most parsimonious to conclude that
our prosociality is simply the result of cooperative breeding too,
i.e., that the same regularity applies to non-human and human
primates alike (Burkart et al., 2014).
So far, primate proactive prosociality has mostly been studied
from the dyadic perspective. However, in humans, it also
encompasses the third-party context. Social evaluation studies
address whether subjects, after observing how target individuals
interact with others, avoid antisocial target individuals (and thus
show a negativity bias) or prefer prosocial and cooperative target
individuals (positivity bias). For instance, babies already have
a preference for agents who help, rather than hinder others
(Hamlin et al., 2007). Such studies are also increasingly done with
non-human animals, as reviewed in Abdai and Miklósi (2016).
For instance, in a study modeled after Hamlin et al. (2007),
bonobos unexpectedly showed a preference for hinderers, rather
than helpers (Krupenye and Hare, 2018). Abdai and Miklósi
(2016) point out that there are still considerable conceptual and
procedural issues in animal social evaluation studies, in particular
to clearly demonstrate positivity biases. Negativity biases may be
taxonomically far more widespread than positivity biases, since
the need to avoid harm is universal whereas the need to cooperate
is less common. Evidence for positivity biases (which correspond
to the third-party perspective on prosociality) appears present
too in several non-human primate species but is more elusive due
tomethodological issues, including the use of humans rather than
conspecifics as target individuals (see Abdai and Miklósi, 2016).
An important aspect of human prosociality directly follows
from the fact that we evaluate people based on their prosocial
behavior toward others. When deciding whether to behave
prosocially or not, we are highly sensitive to a potential audience.
We thus strongly care not only about to what extent others
behave prosocially, but also about whether others perceive us as
prosocial and thus reliable partners (Goffman, 1959). In dictator
games, which are used by behavioral economists to quantify
other-regarding preferences, humans typically contribute a non-
zero amount of money even if they could keep this money for
themselves without any negative consequences, consistent with
proactive other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003). However, when the same game is played and stylized
eye-cues are added on the answer sheet, these “watching eyes”
elicit increased prosocial donations in such games, which reflects
our strong concern for reputation (Nettle et al., 2013b). In
corresponding experiments with chimpanzees, the same effect
was not found, and the authors concluded that the extreme
human sensitivity to cues of potential conspecific observation
appears absent in chimpanzees (Nettle et al., 2013a, see also
Engelmann et al., 2012).
These findings suggest that chimpanzees are perhaps not the
best species to look for such effects. Rather, these effects would
arguably be most likely in habitually prosocial species, such as
the cooperatively breeding marmoset monkeys. We therefore
studied audience effects on prosocial behavior in this species in a
naturalistic context, i.e., proactive food sharing with immatures
(Brügger et al., 2018). Marmosets live in family groups, and
all members contribute to infant rearing. When the infants are
small, they are carried by all group members, and in big and well-
established groups they sometimes are only handed back to the
mother for breastfeeding. When the infants are older and ingest
solid food, all group members share food with the immatures.
This food sharing can take the form of proactive food sharing, i.e.,
food is offered to the immatures without previous begging, even
when immatures are not even aware that a valuable food item
has been found. To test for an audience effect on proactive food
sharing, we quantified food sharing by helpers with immatures,
either when they were alone with the offspring in a separate room
or when the rest of the family was present. If they were sharing
food to increase their reputation of being a good helper, one
would expect them to share more when an audience was present
than when they were alone with the offspring. The marmosets
were sensitive to the audience, but in the opposite direction
than expected: they showed more proactive food sharing in the
absence of an audience. This effect is in fact consistent with
the well-established bystander apathy (Latané and Darley, 1969)
or diffusion of responsibility (Bierhoff, 2017) effect in humans.
Thus, the marmosets perhaps sharedmore because they felt more
“responsible” to fulfill the immatures’ needs when no one else was
around, but in any case, these results show that they did not take
advantage of this situation to engage in reputation management.
To summarize, a genuine proactive prosocial concern is not
unique to humans but we also see it in other primates, in
particular in those who like humans engage in cooperative
breeding. Nevertheless, to date there is no solid evidence
that primates would take into account whether others behave
prosocially or not. Thus, a third-party perspective on prosociality
appears largely lacking in primates.
Conformity
A second key element of human morality is conformity.
Conformity can be conceptualized in different ways (Van
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Leeuwen et al., 2015; Whiten and van de Waal, 2016a), from
copying the majority, to copying a new behavioral variant while
abandoning a personal preference for a previously acquired
behavioral variant, to not only copying the majority but doing
so with a disproportionate probability. Empirical evidence for
such a disproportionate tendency is scarce in humans (Acerbi
et al., 2016) and also among animals (Aplin et al., 2017). However,
there is increasing evidence in primates for the other forms of
conformity.
Even though chimpanzees may sometimes be reluctant to give
up their personal preferences for learned behaviors (Hrubesch
et al., 2009), other studies have shown that a specific foraging
technique seeded in a group will spread within this group.
Intriguingly, even individuals who independently discovered an
alternative solution would tend to stick to the seeded solution
that was most prevalent in the group (Whiten et al., 2005, 2007).
A similar pattern was also found for capuchin monkeys (Dindo
et al., 2009). Thus, depending on the specific context, primates
can be either conservative (i.e., stick to their personal solution)
or conformist (Hopper et al., 2011).
Perhaps the most striking evidence for conformity in non-
human primates comes from vervet monkeys. Immigrating
males, who in their origin group developed a strong preference
for one type of novel food (artificially colored blue or pink
maize of identical taste), immediately changed their preference
after immigrating in a group where the majority of individuals
preferred the other color (van de Waal et al., 2013; Whiten and
van de Waal, 2016a). The function of this kind of informational
conformity is most likely to quickly adapt to the local knowledge
of the new group. Strong informational conformity also enables
naïve individuals to socially learn cognitively opaque skills where
the causal role of each single step in achieving the overall goal is
not obvious. Thus, a preference for social knowledge over private
knowledge, or an urge to conform can be understood in the
service of self-interest, i.e., to acquire reliable information about
the world.
An interesting phenomenon, which questions whether all
primate conformity is informational, has recently been reported
from the same vervet monkey population. In one of the study
groups, a small number of subordinate females split off to form
its own group. In the original parent group, the individuals
preferred blue maize. However, since the females from the future
splinter group were subordinate, they had not always had access
to the preferred food, and therefore also had repeatedly sampled
the pink maize, with some having eaten even more pink than
blue maize in the parent group. After group fission, all these
previously subordinate females could now freely express their
preference in the new splinter group, and continued to show
a strong preference for blue maize (even after 4 month, they
ate 100% of the time blue maize). They thus still conformed to
the preference of the parent group even though they were no
longer surrounded by individuals from the parent group, and
even though there was no difference in the taste between the blue
and the pinkmaize (in fact, some never even knew that one or the
other color had been unpalatable). There can thus be remarkable
resilience in preferences established through social learning, at
least in vervet monkeys, and the authors propose the notion of
social conformity, i.e., that individuals act like others to achieve a
social function and simply be “like others”, rather than to achieve
an informational benefit (van de Waal et al., 2017). In fact,
being more similar to others may facilitate group integration, and
increasing evidence suggests that primates indeed prefer others
who are more similar to themselves as social partners (Paukner
et al., 2009; Massen and Koski, 2014; Capitanio et al., 2017; Ruch
et al., 2018).
In sum, at the individual level, several instances of conformity
can be found in nonhuman primates, which can result in
informational and perhaps also social benefits. But what about
the third-party perspective? The third-party perspective becomes
obvious in normative conformity, which consists not only of an
individual’s urge to conform (the individual perspective), but also
of the expectation of others that the individual converges to their
group’s norms (the third party perspective). In general, as we
will review below, normative conformity is absent in non-human
primates, but the situation may be slightly more differentiated,
depending on the specific norm that is at stake. In the following
sections, we therefore turn to specific contents of potential
norms in primates, making the fundamental distinction between
(putative) social norms that have a universal and presumably
biologically anchored vs. an arbitrary and culturally variable
content.
Social Norms I: Universal, Biologically
Anchored Contents
The contents of morality are norms, which permeate every aspect
of human life and systematically guide our behavior (Gelfand and
Jackson, 2016). Social norms are notoriously difficult to define.
They broadly refer to implicit or explicit rules that prescribe
behavior, whose violation elicits social sanctions. They range
from being more or less compulsory (e.g., not to murder vs. to eat
with chop-sticks), to being just common sense, as in conventions.
Their content can be arbitrary and therefore culturally variable,
or universal and biologically anchored. The two distinctions often
overlap, but not always. For instance, not to commit murder
is most likely compulsory and universal in most societies, but
also more arbitrary norms such as taking off one’s shoes before
entering a house can be compulsory in a given society. Universal
norms, however, tend to be compulsory in most societies (for a
more detailed discussion of the nature of norms, see also Rudolf
von Rohr et al., 2011).
Identifying universal moral norms in humans is still an
ongoing endeavor (e.g., Barrett et al., 2016) but they minimally
include the contents of not harming infants, avoiding inequity,
caring for one’s own offspring, and avoiding incest. Some
evidence suggests that they may be present at least in dyadic,
but sometimes even in third-party contexts in non-human
primates too. In dyadic contexts, they are observed when
interaction partners expect each other to behave in a specific way
consistent with a potential norm, whereas in third-party contexts,
uninvolved bystanders who observe interactions between other
dyads would expect these dyad partners to interact in this way,
and experience disapproval or even show moralistic aggression
upon violations of this expectation.
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Among chimpanzees, for instance (but also among many
other primates), infants usually enjoy high levels of tolerance
and are hardly ever harmed by others. However, exceptions
exist, which eventually even include infanticide (Townsend
et al., 2007). Naturalistic observations show that bystanders who
observe harmful behaviors often show strong reactions (Goodall,
1971; de Waal, 1991), such as waa barks (protest vocalizations:
Clay et al., 2016), and even direct interventions in the form
of policing (Rudolf von Rohr et al., 2012). Harmful behaviors
toward infants elicit particularly strong reactions (Goodall, 1977;
Townsend et al., 2007), such as interventions and defense of
the mother-infant pair by multiple group members, sometimes
culminating in highly dramatic situations. These behaviors are
consistent with a strong third-party bystander reaction toward
infanticide. However, it is important to note that these bystanders
are not completely uninvolved, since they (e.g., other mothers
with dependent offspring) may still have a very strong individual
stake in discouraging infanticide by group males. We therefore
presented captive chimpanzees with video clips of infanticide
committed by completely unaffected third parties (conspecifics
in the wild). The chimpanzees indeed clearly reacted to this
norm violation: they paid far more attention to these clips
compared with control videos depicting hunting scenes (lethal
aggression against small hetero-specific monkeys), grooming
and nut cracking, or displays and aggression between adult
chimpanzees. However, this expectation violation as evident in
looking times did not also translate in higher levels of arousal.
Together, these results suggest that chimpanzees do indeed react
strongly toward the violation of the putative norm “do not harm
infants,” including indignation-like expressions, but only if this
happens in the within-group context. As truly non-involved
bystanders, they still appear to detect such a putative norm
violation, but this is not accompanied by overt disapproval (e.g.,
no arousal, and no waa-barks; Rudolf von Rohr et al., 2015). It
is worth pointing out that in humans too, morality tends to be
parochial in that we feel stronger about norm violations within
the group (Fessler et al., 2015, but see Piazza and Sousa, 2016),
and that punishment of norm violations is often not altruisitic
(Guala, 2012).
Vervet monkey mothers too appear to expect that others
don’t harm their infants, and adult males behave accordingly
(Hector et al., 1989). In an experiment, vervet males showed
less aggression toward an infant if the infant’s mother could see
them compared to when not. Furthermore, mothers were more
aggressive toward males after separation when they had observed
the male behaving aggressively to the infant through a one-
way mirror. Thus, vervet mothers appear to evaluate the males
based on their behavior toward infants (and can act accordingly,
because of minor sexual size dimorphism), and males adjust their
behavior toward infants depending on whether they could be
seen by the mothers. But again, mothers don’t count as truly
non-involved bystanders because they have high stakes in the
well-being of their infants.
Inequity aversion is another content particularly closely
related to morality (Decety and Yoder, 2017). It can take the form
of disadvantageous inequity aversion, i.e., an aversion against
being treated unfairly, such as receiving a lower reward for the
same amount of work compared to a partner, which is egocentric.
Alternatively, it can be advantageous inequity aversion, i.e., an
aversion against obtaining a reward that is higher than that of a
partner, which is therefore allocentric. In humans, both forms can
already be observed in 3 year old toddlers (Ulber et al., 2017).
Inequity aversion has also been reported in a variety of primate
species (reviewed in Talbot et al., 2016; Ulber et al., 2017; but see
Engelmann et al., 2017), but only in the egocentric form (but see
Brosnan et al., 2010).
Disadvantageous inequity aversion is consistent with an
individualistic perspective on one’s own benefit, whereas
advantageous inequity aversion includes a prominent prosocial
element and is a particularly strong indicator for a concern
with equity per se. However, both types of inequity aversion
include personal involvement, which can automatically trigger
a self-serving bias that may overshadow equity preferences.
This methodological problem can be overcome by quantifying
inequity aversion in third-party contexts. In third-party contexts,
the question is whether individuals have a preference for the
fairness between third parties, and self-serving biases therefore
no longer interfere. This can be a preference for a fair distribution
of rewards (i.e., fifty-fifty in dyads), but also a preference for
distributions that take into account merit and wealth, which has
been shown to be already present in young children (Kanngiesser
and Warneken, 2012; Paulus, 2014). We are not aware of any
work on this among non-human primates.
A final universal and biologically determined content of
human social norms is incest avoidance. Incest avoidance if often
construed as a cultural taboo (Turner and Maryanski, 2015),
and we have strong third-party attitudes toward it, for instance
including indignation and disgust in the case of sibling sex
(Fessler and Navarrete, 2004). Nevertheless, incest avoidance is
also practiced by non-human primates (Bischof, 1975; Pusey and
Wolf, 1996), and is particularly strong in callitrichid monkeys
(marmosets and tamarins: Saltzman, 2003; Saltzman et al., 2004).
For instance, opposite-sex callitrichid siblings can be kept for
years without them engaging in reproduction or sexual behavior,
and also fathers show no sexual interest in their reproductively
mature daughters. These preferences are especially adaptive in
the callitrichid social system because offspring of both sexes often
remain in their natal group for extended periods of time and
help raise their younger siblings. But again, unlike in humans
(Fessler and Navarrete, 2004), there is no evidence that other
group members or even non-involved third parties would object
to close kin having sexual relationships (although we are not
aware of any direct test of this idea).
Taken together, non-human primates often have clear
expectations about how others should interact with them. In fact,
we can readily add other examples, such as the expectation of
dominants regarding how subordinates should behave toward
them, or how a partner should behave during playful interactions.
Thus, natural social rules appear ubiquitous in primates and
in fact in other gregarious species too, but a crucial limitation
in most cases is that these rules are applied only to actual
or potential partners but not in third-party contexts when
uninvolved bystanders are concerned. Exceptions may be found
in some specific contexts, such as shown in the case of infanticide
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in chimpanzees, who show strong bystander reactions, as long
as norm violations occur within their social group but not when
they occur in complete stranger conspecifics. Similar reactions
are not unlikely in other primate species susceptible to male
infanticide (van Schaik and Janson, 2000).
Social Norms II: Arbitrary, Culturally
Variable Contents
Arbitrary, culturally variable norms are particularly salient
elements of human morality, and at least in part responsible for
the traditional view that morality is a purely cultural innovation
(de Waal, 2006; Haidt, 2013). Nevertheless, cultural behavioral
variation has also been described for non-human primates and
other animals (Whiten and van de Waal, 2016b). Behavioral
innovations can spread via social learning within populations,
which leads to cultural differences in behavioral repertoires,
and these are particularly large in great ape species such as
chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 2017) and orangutans (van Schaik
et al., 2009). These cultures differ from human cultures in that
they are not cumulative and also not symbolic (Gruber et al.,
2015).
As discussed in detail in section Conformity, such primate
cultures can be supported by strong informational and perhaps
social conformity. Nevertheless, they are not supported by
normative conformity. In other words, individuals may be eager
to conform to other group members even in the case of arbitrary,
culturally variable behaviors (e.g., eating pink instead of blue corn
in vervet monekys: van de Waal et al., 2013, or specific tool
use techniques in chimpanzees: Luncz and Boesch, 2014), but
the group members who are performing the majority behavior
appear to have no stake in whether others conform or not, let
alone show signs of indignation or even punishment of non-
conformers. This might also explain why conformity can also
be absent in cultural behaviors, as for instance in high-arm
grooming among chimpanzees (Wrangham et al., 2016).
CONCLUSIONS
Our goal was to provide an overview over the current state of the
art on research into the evolutionary origin of morality (see also
van Schaik et al., 2014). We did so by analyzing both its ultimate
function in our own species, and investigating the phylogenetic
origin of elements of human morality in non-human primates.
We propose that the ultimate function of human morality is
best understood as a straightforward adaptation that enabled the
fundamentally interdependent lifestyle of our hunter-gatherer
ancestors. Even though full-blown morality is most likely unique
to humans, several of its key elements can be found in non-
human primates and some other animals. Our goal was to
provide an overview of the occurrence of such elements in non-
human primates, to understand under what conditions they
emerged during evolution, and to better delineate in which ways
human morality is unique (Figure 1). We therefore focused on
two key components of morality, i.e., a prosocial concern and
conformity, and the contents of natural and arbitrary, cultural
norms. These elements are arguably necessary and crucial for the
emergence of morality, but not sufficient. Additional elements
include language (discussed below), parochialism (Baumgartner
et al., 2012; Fessler et al., 2015), and perhaps coalitional
psychology (DeScioli and Kurzban, 2013). For the elements
discussed in this paper, there is evidence from non-human
primates and sometimes from other animals as well. The contents
can be highly species-specific, adapted to the social requirements
of a given species. An evolutionary perspective onmoral behavior
therefore suggests that with regard to content, it may be useful
to distinguish between human morality, chimpanzee morality,
marmoset morality, and so on.
Intriguingly, some of these elements of morality are not
necessarily most prevalent in our closest relatives, the great apes.
In particular the key element of prosocial concern is stronger
in primates that show more similarities in social structure with
humans, namely the cooperatively breeding callitrichid monkeys.
The lives of humans are very much different from that of
other great apes, in modern societies as in hunter-gatherers.
Compared to non-human great apes, every domain of our lives
is built on high levels of interdependence (van Schaik and
Burkart, 2010; Tomasello, 2016), from subsistence (foraging) and
institutionalized activities to rearing children. Nevertheless, a
high degree of interdependence is not unique to humans, but
also present in other primates, in particular in cooperatively
breeding callitrichid monkeys who also raise their offspring with
the help of all group members (Hrdy, 2009). It thus appears
that some of the elements of morality evolved convergently
in highly cooperative, interdependent species (such as humans
and callitrichid monkeys) but not in more individualistic ones
(such as chimpanzees). Based on comparative studies, we have
argued that interdependence during infant rearing is key, but
others place greater emphasis on the role of interdependence
during foraging (Tomasello et al., 2012; Tomasello and Gonzalez-
Cabrera, 2017). Note, however, that arguably, the latter could
only emerge once some basic proactive prosociality that facilitates
cooperation and sharing had evolved in the context of shared
offspring care (van Schaik and Burkart, 2010).
Obviously, cooperatively breeding callitrichid monkeys
don’t have full-blown human morality, perhaps because more
cognitively demanding elements of morality appear well-beyond
the capacities of these small brained monkeys. Systematic
comparative analyses confirm that cognitive abilities across
non-human primates are correlated with brain size, and humans
fit this pattern too (Burkart et al., 2017a). Accordingly, the
very big brained great apes have many remarkable cognitive
abilities, and a valid working hypothesis is that it was the unique
coincidence in our ancestors of two elements that enabled full-
blown morality: the strong cognitive abilities, supported by big
brains and inherited from our common ancestors with the other
great apes on the one hand, and on the other hand our strong
prosocial concern, which was added convergently because our
ancestors started to engage in cooperative infant care sometime
after they had diverged from the other great ape lineage (Burkart
et al., 2009; Burkart and van Schaik, 2016). For instance, great
apes, but not callitrichids, appear to show disadvantageous
inequity aversion in that they are upset when they receive a
lower-value reward compared to a social partner (Talbot et al.,
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FIGURE 1 | The presence of elements of morality in non-human primates.
2016). This suggests that they are accurately keeping track of
each other’s efforts and the amount of reward obtained for it.
However, only when this cognitive precondition is coupled with
a stable prosocial concern for others (as it is the case in our own
species only) may we also see disadvantageous inequity aversion,
or an aversion from the perspective of an uninvolved bystander
toward inequity between two social partners.
A striking pattern for all these elements is that even though
they are present in at least some primate species, they are
fundamentally restricted to the individual perspective in non-
human primates (Figure 1). We can imagine three possible,
non-exclusive explanations for the emergence of the third-party
perspective in human morality. First, the third-party perspective
may simply require even more sophisticated mentalizing abilities
and perhaps language. However, a third-party perspective is
not even taken systematically by chimpanzees, for whom
increasing evidence for quite impressive mentalizing abilities
is available (Krupenye et al., 2016). Likewise, the case
of human psychopaths suggests that language per se is
at least not a sufficient condition for full-blown human
morality (Hare, 1999).
A second possible explanation for the origin of the third-
party perspective, in particular in the case of conformity, emerges
in the face of increasing evidence for assortative preferences in
primates (see also Haun and Over, 2015 for a similar argument).
This body of evidence suggests that primates have a general
preference for partners that are like themselves (Paukner et al.,
2009; Massen and Koski, 2014; Capitanio et al., 2017; Ruch et al.,
2018). In situations of high interdependence at the group level,
it is important for individuals to have reliable relationships with
all group members, which can result in a preference for ego to
conform to the behaviors of the group. However, it may also
mean that the group members themselves now have a stake in
newcomers to conform, i.e., normative expectations. In other
words, similarity, for instance in vocal communication, may turn
into a tag for affiliation and cooperation (Cohen et al., 2012;
Ruch et al., 2018) and signal an individuals’ readiness to be a
reliable member of the group, which is important for all group
members. For the individual, this will lead to an increasing urge
to conform not only for informational, but also for social reasons
(van de Waal et al., 2017). In other group members, it will lead
to the normative expectation that a specific individual indeed
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conform. This explanation is also consistent with studies that
find only weak evidence for the idea that group norms are the
only or principal explanation for third-party moral judgments in
humans (Krasnow et al., 2012; Delton and Krasnow, 2017), or
that norm-based punishment is not necessarily altruistic (Guala,
2012).
Finally, the third-party perspective may simply have emerged
as a byproduct of the increasing importance of indirect
reciprocity, which is an essential element of the ecological
interdependence of human foragers. Indirect reciprocity critically
involves the observation and evaluation of interactions between
third parties, so as to assess the suitability of each participant as
recipient of prosocial actions and thus as a partner in exchanges.
Once such evaluations of third parties are shared with others
in the cooperation network through language, they can easily
acquire the same emotional status as judgments about direct
partners, i.e., second parties.
Language may thus have played a crucial role for the evolution
of full-blown human morality. First, as just argued, it amplifies
the importance of reputation effects, because misbehavior can
be made public via gossip to the entire group. Language thus
likely is the key driver for our obsession with reputation (see
also van Schaik, 2016), and that even most subtle cues of being
observed can significantly influence our behavior (Nettle et al.,
2013b). Second, language enables negotiation and therefore the
formation of formal, explicit and institutionalized rules, and
thus can lead to culturally modified contents of social and
moral norms. Linked to this, language and language-based moral
reflection may well be responsible for the finding that the
truly independent third-party perspective (i.e., also including
out-group contexts) is only found in humans. Unreflected
moral judgments, emotions, and preferences are typically highly
parochial: humans spontaneously caremost about their in-group,
in particular when we are under duress (Baumgartner et al., 2012;
De Dreu et al., 2015; Fessler et al., 2015). This in-group bias can
be overcome when we manage to view out-group individuals
at least as potential in-group members, but also via explicit,
language-based moral reasoning.
Finally, through language, spontaneous behavioral
predispositions themselves can secondarily become the content
of a norm, via representational redescription of pre-existing
behavioral tendencies (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Above, we
have exemplified this for the case of incest avoidance, a
behavioral predisposition present in animals that in humans
also takes the form of a cultural taboo (Turner and Maryanski,
2015). However, representational redescription also occurs
in the case of the behavioral mechanisms of morality per
se, such as prosocial concern. In this case, our prosocial
concern may appear the result of purely cultural processes
linked to language, whereas prosociality tests with primates
have shown that it is more likely the simple convergent
result of cooperative breeding, a general pattern that applies
broadly.
In sum, we find that human morality had an important
adaptive function in our hunter-gatherer ancestors in that
it undergirded the extraordinarily interdependent lifestyle.
Nevertheless, human morality was not invented from scratch
in our hominin ancestors but could build on a rich set of
pre-adaptations. A critical transition was the transformation
of these elements to appear not only in individualistic and
second-party contexts, but also in true third-party constellations.
Based on evidence from the primate behavior and cognition
literature, we are just beginning to understand how this
transition and thus normativity emerged. Many new hypotheses
emerge from this endeavor and will need to be tested in the
future.
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